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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-4806

ARTHUR PERRYMAN, JR.,
Appellant
v.
H & R TRUCKING, INC., and/or; H & R TRUCKING CO., and/or;
H & R TRUCKING COMPANY OF NORTHFIELD, INC., and/or;
H&R TRUCKING CO. OF NORTHFIELD, LLC; JOHN DOE OWNER, #1-5;
JOHN DOE COMPANY, #1-5; JOHN DOE INC., #1-5;
RYDER TRUCK RENTAL, INC.;
JOHN DOE OWNER, #6-10; JOHN DOE COMPANY #6-10; JOHN DOE INC., #6-10;
JEFFREY V. MILLER; JOHN DOE 1-5; RICHARD ROE 1-10;
RICHARD ROE COMPANY 1-10; RICHARD ROE INC., 1-10 jointly,
severally and/or in the alternative

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 01-cv-05860)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 9, 2005
Before: AMBRO, VAN ANTWERPEN and TASHIMA*, Circuit Judges

* Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.

(Opinion filed June 22, 2005)

OPINION

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Appellant Arthur Perryman filed an action in the District Court for injuries
sustained when his tractor-trailer allegedly was struck by another tractor-trailer driven by
Jeffrey Miller, an employee of H&R Trucking, Inc. After a trial, the jury assessed
comparative responsibility for the accident at 60% for Miller and 40% for Perryman and
determined a gross damages award of $39,000 in Perryman’s favor. Dissatisfied with this
result, Perryman sought a new trial on the basis of, inter alia, several alleged erroneous
evidentiary rulings. The District Court denied this motion and Perryman timely appealed.
For the reasons described below, we reject each of Perryman’s contentions and affirm the
judgment of the District Court.1 Because we write solely for the parties, we do not recite
the facts underlying this appeal.
I.
Perryman first argues that Miller’s counsel improperly influenced the verdict by
referring in closing argument to evidence not before the jury. Specifically, Perryman
alleges that Miller’s counsel held up a voluminous appendix of Perryman’s medical
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We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
2

records that had been admitted into evidence only in part. Perryman does not dispute that
the most relevant portions of that medical history were properly introduced at trial. His
objection is confined to the jury’s exposure to the volume (and, by implication, extent) of
his medical history. This timely objection was rejected by the District Court at trial.
“‘The remarks of counsel [are] required to be confined to the evidence admitted in
the case. . . . Reversible error is committed when counsel’s closing argument to the jury
introduces extraneous matter that has a reasonable probability of influencing the
verdict.’” Reed v. Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England R. R. Co., 939 F.2d 128,
133-34 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164, 170 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977)). “In matters of trial procedure such as that involved here,
the trial judge is entrusted with wide discretion because he is in a far better position than
we to appraise the effect of the improper argument of counsel.” Id. at 133.
In this case, we easily conclude that the District Court acted well within its
discretion when it determined that counsel’s physical reference to the appendix did not
produce a reasonable probability of improper influence. In light of the evidence of preexisting medical conditions that was properly admitted, we agree with the District Court
that counsel’s errant implication concerning the extent of Perryman’s medical history was
harmless and does not warrant a new trial.
II.
Perryman next contends that the District Court incorrectly applied Fed. R. Evid.
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609(a)(1) when it determined that the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence as to the
nature of Miller’s prior crime outweighed its potential probative value.2 Rule 609(a)(1)
provides that, for the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the
witness’ conviction of a crime punishable by one or more years in prison is admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect. See, e.g., Johnson, 388 F.3d at 100. Miller was convicted of sexual
assault, a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. The District Court
concluded that admitting evidence of Miller’s criminal conviction would yield a net
probative effect so long as the specific nature of the crime committed was not disclosed to
the jury.
We are not swayed by Perryman’s position that the District Court erred by denying
him the opportunity to inform the jury that Miller had been convicted of sexual assault.
Perryman stresses the importance of each witness’ credibility in his case. Likewise, the
District Court properly considered the importance of meaningful credibility assessments
to an informed jury verdict in this case, weighing that interest against the extremely
prejudicial effect that would be caused by the jury’s knowledge of a prior sexual assault
conviction. The District Court concluded that admission of less prejudicial
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With regard to Perryman’s remaining arguments, we review the District Court’s
decision whether to admit evidence for abuse of discretion, but exercise plenary review
over its construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Johnson, 388
F.3d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2004).
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evidence—namely, the fact of Miller’s conviction of a crime and resulting imprisonment
without further detail—would balance these conflicting interests. App. at 472.
We endorse the District Judge’s careful approach. Cf. Old Chief v. United States,
519 U.S. 172 (1997) (mandating similar approach under Rule 404 in a prosecution for a
crime that includes felony-convict status as an element, and explaining that in certain
circumstances the admission of evidence pertaining to the name or nature of a conviction
runs afoul of a Rule 403 prejudice balancing). The District Court properly construed
Rule 609 and acted well within the discretion that Rule confers.
III.
Perryman next objects to the introduction of photographs depicting the tractortrailers involved in the accident. Specifically, he argues that, because the photographs did
not reveal any damage to the vehicles and because the jury lacked the expertise required
to assess the extent of personal injuries that might have been caused in spite of the
absence of physical damage to the vehicles, the admission of the photographs was so
prejudicial as to be an abuse of the District Court’s discretion. To be clear, Perryman
asks us to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence
photographs of the actual vehicles involved in the accident that gave rise to this
dispute—his lawsuit for damages arising from the accident.
Rule 403 codifies the evidentiary principle that the probative value and prejudicial
effect of offered evidence must be weighed in determining its admissibility. Under this
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rule, evidence is excluded only if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value.3 See, e.g., United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Services (PA), Inc.,
205 F.3d 657, 664–65 (3d Cir. 2000). We have explained that the rule implements a
presumption in favor of admissibility. Id.
Perryman’s contention that the District Court failed to adhere to Rule 403 by
admitting the photographs is far off the mark. Surely photographs demonstrating that the
vehicles involved in the accident sustained no physical damage are highly probative in a
case in which, as here, the parties dispute the extent and cause of alleged personal
injuries. Nor is it clear how Perryman was prejudiced by their introduction unless he is
erroneously asserting some right to keep from the jury details of the very accident that
spawned his suit. Far from finding an abuse of discretion by the District Court, we
wonder if the Court could have defensibly ruled otherwise.
Perryman also argues that Fed. R. Evid. 701 prohibited the District Court from
allowing the photographs to be introduced. Rule 701, entitled “Opinion Testimony by
Lay Witnesses,” applies when a “witness is not testifying as an expert.” We fail to see
how this rule governing testimonial evidence of a layperson’s opinion bears any relevance
to the District Court’s decision to admit photographic evidence. Unfortunately,
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We emphasize yet again that, because of his presence in the courtroom, “[t]he trial
judge, not the appellate judge, is in the best position to assess the extent of the prejudice
caused a party by a piece of evidence.” United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir.
1978).
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Perryman’s brief offers little insight to this end. It seems to equate the jury’s deliberative
process—as influenced by the photographic evidence—with opinion testimony by a nonexpert witness and argues that Rule 701 confines not only the scope of admissible
testimony in this context but also, by extension, the type of questions that can properly be
left to the jury to answer. While this metaphorical reasoning is theoretically interesting,
we discern no basis to adopt it. We thus find no error in the District Court’s admission of
the photographs.
IV.
Perryman next asserts that the Court erred by denying his motion for post-trial
relief and sanctions on the ground of his “fraud against the court” theory. This fraud is
alleged to have occurred when Miller perjured himself before the jury. Perryman argues
that the District Court should have granted him a new trial and imposed sanctions against
Miller when it was revealed in open court that Miller had lied in order to conceal the fact
that he had been incarcerated. As explained by the District Court, it allowed Perryman to
impeach Miller by admitting evidence of his prior conviction and incarceration.4 App. at
872. Perryman nonetheless asserts that he was prejudiced by Miller’s exposed perjury.
The District Court considered and rejected this argument. For the reasons it expressed,
we do the same.
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The District Court further concluded that, although the jury heard evidence of the
perjury, it did not appear to assign significant value to it. App. at 876.
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We also conclude that there is no basis upon which to support Perryman’s
argument that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for sanctions
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
V.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

8

